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REVIEWS
of the scholarship that went into her more extensive study of Coke. There
are times when the reader feels that her appraisals of Bacon are naively in
Bacon's favor,28 and there are small annoyances, such as the absence of docu-
mentation . 2  But those are unimportant defects in a fascinating study of a
puzzling man.
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ONCE known as "The Gilded Age," the quarter of a century of American
history following the Civil War has recently been undergoing reconsidera-
tion. Historians of a previous generation I used to echo Vernon L. Parring-
ton's stereotype about the "Great Barbecue, ' 2 during which unscrupulous
businessmen and political spoilsmen used the national and state governments
to prey upon poor farmers and oppressed laborers. In the last few years,
however, young scholars 3 have challenged this stereotype by pointing out that
the business community of the 1870's and 1880's was itself badly split over
ideology and economic policy, that the politicians often worked at cross-pur-
poses from the "robber barons" for whom they were supposedly fronts, that
farmers were comparatively well off, and that, except for a setback in the
28. For instance, she attributes Bacon's opposition, to Coke as principally growing
out of a loyalty to the idea of the philosopher-king, "whose reign, efficient and benevolent,
would benefit art and education as well as the people." P. 141. This may not be entirely
consistent with Bacon's efforts to have Coke's Reports suppressed, with his issuance of an
information charging Coke with riotous behavior when Coke had a quarrel with his
family, or with the elaborate and successful campaign Bacon mounted, when at the height
of his power as Chancellor, to have Coke removed from office as Lord Chief Justice.
Pp. 139, 158; THE LioN AND TEE THRONE 385-88, 396.
29. "To encumber such a book with scholarly apparatus seemed, superfluous."
Author's Note, p. 235. Mrs. Bowen's accuracy on legal details is usually amazing. One
might, though, take issue with her statement: "Decisions in the common-law courts are
still subject to review by higher authority ...in the United States by the Supreme
Court." Pp. 138-39. But this is the sort of quibble that should be confined to a footnote.
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1873-77 depression, industrial wages in the United States steadily increased
from 1865 to 1891. Meanwhile, other historians 4 have been attacking the cor-
relative cliche that the Supreme Court during the Gilded Age stood guard to
protect the "interests" from the "people."
The most recent salvo in this skirmish has been fired 'by Professor C. Peter
Magrath, of Brown University, in his excellent and learned biography of
Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, who presided over the Supreme Court from
1874 to 1888. Drawing heavily upon Waite's own unpublished papers and
upon the manuscripts of his contemporaries, Mr. Magrath has framed his
argument with great shrewdness. Avoiding hero-worship, he makes no claim
that Waite was appointed because of his proved ability or national reputation;
instead he shows that President Grant named the Ohioan only after three (or
possibly five) other preferred candidates had been eliminated. Nor does Mr.
Magrath seek to rehabilitate Waite's reputation by presenting him as a pres-
ent-day liberal concerned with civil rights. The Chief Justice chose the road
to reunion rather than the path of racial equality. In the Reese 5 case he
effectively torpedoed the Radical plan of protecting the Negro by direct fed-
eral action; in the Cruikshank 6 decision he helped emasculate the fourteenth
amendment; and in the Civil Rights Cases 7 he concurred in an opinion nullify-
ing the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Mr. Magrath's argument that it is "essentially
irrelevant" to judge these decisions "according to modern standards of what
constitutes social justice for the Negro"8 is not entirely convincing. After all,
Justice Harlan's masterful dissent in the Civil Rights Cases clearly showed
that there was another course open to the Court, and indeed Waite himself,
as his unusual concern for Negro education suggests, seems to have had a
guilty conscience about his decisions.
More convincing is Mr. Magrath's refutation of the idea advanced by
Robert G. McCloskey and Benjamin F. Wright that Waite's opinions on
economic issues served as an unlimited guarantee of private property against
public regulation. Such an argument, Mr. Magrath persuasively pleads, is a
misreading of the record. Waite's rural, almost pioneer, Ohio background
made him a representative of "the ante-bellum class of professional and mer-
cantile men to whom wealth was not an end in itself" ;9 unlike Stephen J.
Field, he was never an intimate of the rapacious millionaires of the postwar
generation. His opinion in Munn v. Illinois 10 meant exactly what it seemed
to mean, a recognition of public over private right. If phrases from his
opinions were subsequently used as a concession to laissez-faire, Mr. Magrath
4. See, e.g., TRIMBLE, CHrIEF JUSTIC WAITE, DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(1938), and FAnRAx, MR. JUSTICE MnIR AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890 (1939).
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reminds us that "the actual decisions clearly pointed in the direction of sup-
port for public regulation.""1 So long as Waite was Chief Justice, the Court
"never became, wittingly or unwittingly, a tool of business."'
12
In view of the record which Mr. Magrath so ably presents, one is tempted
to ask why constitutional historians often underrate Chief Justice Waite. Per-
haps the simplest explanation is that for years Waite has been the victim of
the envious Justice Samuel F. Miller's witticism: "I can't make a silk purse
out of a sow's ear. I can't make a great Chief Justice out of a small man."'
More basic, however, is the present-day unpopularity of some of Waite's
fundamental ideas. In an age of growing nationalism the Chief Justice never
outgrew his conviction that the Constitution meant what it seemed to mean
and that in a federal system it was imperative to differentiate between the
functions of the central and the local governments. In both civil rights cases
and cases involving economic legislation Waite cast his votes for states' rights.
Another of his basic beliefs was in judicial deference to legislative decisions.
"Of the propriety of legislative interference within the scope of legislative
power," the Chief Justice said tartly, "the legislature is the exclusive judge."'14
"In my judgment," he added, "the fault of Judges sometimes is to try and
make too much law at once.'
5
Because such beliefs may be unfashionable these days, it is unlikely that
Professor Magrath's book will succeed in making of Chief Justice Waite
either a major or a respected figure in our judicial history. But his biography
of the neglected Chief Justice should do much to demolish the stereotype that
the Court in the postwar decades was simply the bulwark of private property.
In presenting this revisionist view, Mr. Magrath has proved himself one of
the ablest of the young historians who are painting a new and more complex
picture of the decades following the Civil War.
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THuiS is a probing and provocative study of the law and public policy in-
volved in the reimbursement of corporate executives for personal liability
arising out of their corporate connections. Its publication coincides with a
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